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11 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director/OSA

SUBJECT : Outline of Security Action Recommended to Protect Project OXCART as a Result of the Surfacing of the USAF X-21/R-X Program

REFERENCE : [redacted] dtd 10 January 1963, Memo from AD/OSA to Director of Security Identifying "Information which Must Continue to be Protected under Project OXCART subsequent to the Surfacing of the X-21/R-X Program."

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for your concurrence in paragraph 7.

2. The effective continuation under Project OXCART Security procedures of the information outlined in the referenced memorandum depends immediately and primarily on a coordinated, timely and thorough briefing of Key Governmental and Industrial officials who may be called upon to respond or react to the initial release of the X-21/R-X Program. A listing of Key Governmental Organizations and Industrial facilities is attached as Attachment #1

3. It is proposed that the items enumerated in referenced memorandum be immediately coordinated with Headquarters USAF, and promulgated to AFCIG-5 and the KEDLOCK Project Office at Wright Patterson AFB; these two offices are the focal points within USAF for all OXCART/KEDLOCK security procedures. Upon final agreement between CIA and USAF as to what information will continue under Project OXCART Security restrictions, it is further proposed that the briefing suggested in para 1, above, be conducted by CIA Security Agents currently assigned to OSA/DBR, wherever possible. A proposed schedule for responsible briefing officers is attached as Attachment #2.


4. The context of the required briefing will necessarily differ for Governmental and Industrial personnel, since the vast majority in the latter category have never been witting

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of CIA participation. Consequently, the rebriefing of fully witting personnel will consist of promulgating the items outlined in the referenced memorandum. Industrial personnel, unwitting of CIA, will be rebriefed along the following lines: "The R-X program, as announced by the DOD on (date) is indeed the object of our in-house effort. We shall continue to operate under the same security rules, treating our activity as completely classified in our dealings with uncleared people. Security Rules remain the same, without relaxation, concerning the capabilities of our hardware, delivery schedules, names of other contractors, production numbers and state of flight tests. This is the rule, regardless of what you may see or hear through public news media. In a word the DOD is admitting the existence of a Program but intends to publicize a minimum of detail. Any inquiries will be referred to a key company man who in turn will refer them to the established DOD releasing officer (via Project Hqs.)

5. The following timetable of required actions is recommended:

- a. CIA-USAF coordination outlined in para 2 above.
- b. Determine date of proposed release.
- c. Establish single focal point within DOD (preferably USAF) for release of any information pertaining to Program. Promulgate the identity of that office to Key Suppliers and Government Agencies. (Response to local inquiries by key people should be "the R-X program is continuing under the same Security Restrictions mentioned in the release and any questions concerning the Program are to be directed to the Office of _____".)
- d. Briefing of Governmental and Industrial Officials by Security representatives as outlined in para 2 above. Appropriate OSA field Security Officers will be briefed at Hqs. prior to conducting briefings at field facilities and installations.
- e. At an appropriate time (probably subsequent to the release) change the names OXCART and KEDLOCK. The new OXCART designation will in future refer only to individuals witting of the CIA, A-12, sponsorship and operation. The

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new KEDLOCKE designation will be used for all individuals whose need-to-know is limited to the USAF version(s) of the A-12.

f. Rewriting of briefing brochures concurrently with (e) above.

g. Close coordination with Air Force Project officers to establish sound security controls at Edwards Flight Test Center. This is an area that will tend to break down the compartmentation, since frequent liaison with LAC and [redacted] will be inevitable.

h. Simultaneous with renaming of Project, a personal name by name review of the IBM clearance listing with each industrial supplier and Government agency to reestablish need-to-know.

3. It cannot be overemphasized that the effective implementation of the measures outlined herein depend immediately on (a) full coordination with USAF and (b) sufficient forewarning of the date for the proposed release.

7. It is recommended that we proceed with the implementation of the steps outlined above.

[redacted]
Chief, Security Branch
OSA

Recommendation in Paragraph 7 APPROVED:

(Signed) Jack C. Ledford

JACK C. LEDFORD
AD/OSA

14 JAN 1963

*Prepare but do not execute.
Question of surfacing is
still in doubt.*

OSA/SB: [redacted]

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Attachments

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